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In this paper we examine theoretical utility arguments in metaphysics. While
philosophers claim a procedural continuity with science when using such argu-
ments, we argue that examining famous instances from the history of science
expose their fundamental flaws. We find that arguments from theoretical utility
invoke considerations that are not truth conducive‘ and that justifications for
claims that a theory possesses theoretical virtues oen assume the truth of the
theory such virtues are supposed to support. We conclude that theoretical utility
arguments provide no epistemic grounds for metaphysical inquiry.
Keywords: theoretical utility, consistency, coherence, explanatory power, in-
dispensability, inference to the best explanation, truth.
1 Introduction
e metaphysicians’ project is to delineate what there is and how it is, but it must be
distinguished sharply from the scientists’ project which, at least for naturalists, is fairly
characterized in precisely the same terms. Metaphysicians and at least some scientists
seek informative, illuminating explanations and both seek some grasp of what is more
and what is less fundamental. Scientists have to hand well-known empirical methods
for separating the scientific wheat from chaff, even though all recognize these to be
fallible methods that underdetermine defeasible conclusions.
Lacking the luxury of empirical methods, metaphysicians nevertheless look for
accountings of what there is and how it is that are “deeper” than those available from
empirical methods. Metaphysicians must provide grounds for thinking that their
chosen methods or paerns of inference have some tendency to direct us toward the
truth—such paerns must be truth conducive. e crucial inferences conclude that
∗We are grateful to Steven French for particularly helpful discussions on the issues examined in this
work.
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theories are (more likely to be) true (compared to competitors) when the theories them-
selves have certain internal characteristics, i.e., when they have some sufficiently high
degree of theoretical virtue, such as being simple, unified, expressive, and explanatory.
We will argue that not only would this mode of inference have led us astray had it been
used in some famous empirical contexts, there are no non-question-begging reasons
for thinking that the most commonly cited theoretical virtues are truth conducive at
all. We conclude that this mode of justification is a poor method for well-grounded
metaphysics.
2 Metaphysical eorizing and eoretical Virtues
Scientists are oen presented as positing new ontologies (from atoms to black holes)
when the theories making those posits have a number of theoretical virtues. Some
metaphysicians then seem to assume that if something is good for the sciences, it
should be good for metaphysics as well, ceteris paribus. Sufficient epistemic merit
for arguments from theoretical virtues in metaphysics is claimed on the basis of the
sufficiency of similar arguments in science and mathematics.
e development of both scientific and philosophical theories is a maer of amass-
ing data and then constructing theories that accommodate the data. Speaking for many
in the metaphysics community, Ted Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean Zimmerman
write:
Scientists must regularly choose between many theories that are consis-
tent with the observed data. eir choices are governed by criteria like
simplicity, comprehensiveness, and elegance. is is especially true in
very theoretical parts of science, for instance theoretical physics [. . . ].
[. . . ] Just like scientists, metaphysicians begin with observations, albeit
quite mundane ones: there are objects, these objects have properties, they
last over time, and so on. And just like scientists, metaphysicians go on
to construct general theories based on these observations, even though
the observations do not logically sele which theory is correct. In doing
so, metaphysicians use standards for choosing theories that are like the
standards used by scientists (simplicity, comprehensiveness, elegance, and
so on) (Sider et al., 2008, p. 6).
e emphasis on the continuity between science and metaphysics shapes more
generally Sider’s own epistemology of metaphysics. He correctly highlights the inher-
ently fallible nature of metaphysical inquiry, and identifies the continuity between the
two domains because both use theoretical virtues in theory choice.
e epistemology of metaphysics is far from clear; this any metaphysician
should concede. For what it’s worth, as a general epistemology of meta-
physics I prefer the vague, vaguely inean, thought that metaphysics is
continuous with science. We employ many of the same criteria—whatever
those are—for theory choice within metaphysics that we employ outside
of metaphysics. Admiedly, those criteria give less clear guidance in
metaphysics than elsewhere; but there’s no harm in following this argu-
ment where it leads: metaphysical inquiry is by its nature comparatively
speculative and uncertain (Sider, 2011, p. 12).
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Sider then generalizes the point to support his own preferred ontology: structure.
One’s best theory exhibits the relevant theoretical virtues (Sider singles out simplicity,
explanatory power, and unification). He then follows ine’s advice: the ontology
of one’s best theory should be one’s ontology. He maintains that it is not only the
ontology that is read from one’s best theory; the same goes for the theory’s ideology.
e theoretical resources articulated by one’s best theory are likely to capture the
relevant structure in the world; they “carve at the joints”. Sider writes:
isinean thought suggests an epistemology for structure in particular.
ine’s advice for forming ontological beliefs is familiar: believe the
ontology of your best theory. eories are good insofar as they are simple,
explanatorily powerful, integrate with other good theories, and so on.
We should believe generally what good theories say; so if a good theory
makes an ontological claim, we should believe it. e ontological claim
took part in a theoretical success, and therefore inherits a borrowed luster;
it merits our belief. is all is familiar; but a believer in structure can
say more. A good theory isn’t merely likely to be true. Its ideology is
also likely to carve at the joints. For the conceptual decisions made in
adopting that theory—and not just the theory’s ontology—were vindicated;
those conceptual decisions also took part in a theoretical success, and
also inherit a borrowed luster. So we can add to the inean advice:
regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints. We have
defeasible reason to believe that the conceptual decisions of successful
theories correspond to something real: reality’s structure (Sider, 2011,
p. 12).
Timothy Williamson similarly emphasizes the role that theoretical virtues play in
identifying what a good theory is, while also connecting the goodness of an explanation
to its truth. As he notes:
[…] the more T has the intrinsic virtues of a good theory, the beer (ceteris
paribus). It should be elegant and unified, not arbitrary, gerrymandered, ad
hoc, or messily complicated. It should be informative and general. In brief,
it should combine simplicity with strength (Williamson, 2016, p. 266).
Tellingly, Williamson presents theoretical virtues as being intrinsic to the theory
in question. is makes theory choice by theoretical virtues tractable: one need not
consider factors outside the theory to determine whether it is virtuous or not. Both
properly and troublingly,Williamson frames the explanatory virtue in terms of potential
explanations, which are those that ‘would explain the evidence if [they] were true’ (2016,
p. 266). Properly, because it correctly highlights that the forms of argument become
more tractable if they emphasize the potential nature of explanation, but troubling,
because it makes salient the first important oddity of those forms: the inference that a
theory is the correct explanation because it would be the best explanation.
Proponents of arguments from theoretical virtues face a dilemma. Either theoretical
virtues are intrinsic or they are not. If they are intrinsic, since truth is not an intrinsic
feature of a theory, there is no guarantee that the satisfaction of the theoretical virtues
will make the theory more likely to be true. Below, we cite instances where the world
did not cooperate with virtuous theories. If theoretical virtues are instead extrinsic,
then determining that a theory is virtuous requires accounting for what goes on beyond
the theory and in the world, thus losing the entire point of appealing to the virtues
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in the first place, which is breaking deadlocks that remain from considering extrinsic
factors, as in empirically equivalent theories.
Juha Saatsi has identified, under the heading of “explanationism”, a cluster of
approaches that highlight the role of inferences from theoretical virtues that focus
primarily on how well a theory would explain the relevant phenomena (Saatsi, 2017).
Such approaches then use the best explanation as a basis for believing the relevant
theory. ese inferences are common across a wide range of theories in metaphysics.
ey are used to address topics as diverse as the existence of laws of nature (Armstrong,
1983, 1997; Bigelow and Pargeer, 1990; Dorato, 2012), the existence of mathematical
objects (Colyvan, 2006; Bigelow and Pargeer, 1990), and of abstract objects more
generally (Swoyer, 2008), as well as defences of scientific realism (Psillos, 2005; Ellis,
2009), and the articulation of views in mereology (Bigelow, 2010), ontology of mind
(McLaughlin, 2010), and in the epistemology of modality (Biggs, 2011; Fischer, 2017), all
the way to the very possibility of ontology itself (Swoyer, 1999), and the methodology
and epistemology of metaphysics (Paul, 2012).
Some may urge ranking theories on the basis of their respective theoretical virtues
as the grounds for theory choice only when theories are empirically equivalent. Empir-
ical considerations typically trump theoretical constraints, thus preempting any need
for the use of theoretical virtues. us, only given two or more empirically equivalent
theories would one select the theory that satisfies the theoretical virtues to the greatest
degree. Since typical metaphysical theories make no empirical difference, they are
all empirically equivalent, and choosing theories on the basis of theoretical virtues is
appropriate across the board.
Interestingly, empirical equivalence figures explicitly only in the passage by Sider,
Hawthorne, and Zimmerman. Perhaps the others simply assume the empirical equiva-
lence of metaphysical theories.
Why, though, should one accept this constraint on the relevance and use of the-
oretical virtues in the first place? It is doubtful that all metaphysicians accept the
constraint that theoretical virtues be evaluated only when theories are empirically
equivalent. Some metaphysical theories are not even empirically adequate and hence
cannot be empirically equivalent to theories that are compatible with the empirical
information. For instance, certain metaphysical theories conflict with well-established
results from quantum mechanics or relativity theory. Some require that identity be
applicable to every object and, thus, are inconsistent with certain formulations of
non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Others assume that in principle any material
object could accelerate to speeds beyond that of light, thus conflicting with relativity
theory.
Moreover, if theoretical virtues are indeed truth conducive—something we will
argue against below—why should empirical considerations always trump them any-
way? If a simple, unified, and explanatory theory posits a certain entity, why should
one revise the theory, if such entity is not found? Why not challenge the standing of
the experiments in which the entity in question has not been detected? Or, why not
criticize the interpretations of such experiments so that the established results can
be reconciled with the virtuous theory? If empirical considerations are always given
the upper hand, what grounds are there for thinking that the virtues are indicators of
truth at all? Exactly why can they never aggregate to outweigh the significance of at
least some empirical data? At the very least, maintaining the truth conduciveness of
theoretical virtues requires an account of exactly how they have such epistemic merit
and where they fit the hierarchy of truth-conducive considerations.
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In what follows, we do not assume that theoretical virtues should be applied only to
empirically equivalent theories. In fact, we argue that in a number of prominent cases
in the history of science, had theoretical virtues been used as a guide to theory choice,
scientists would have moved away from the truth. is casts doubt on the adequacy of
the entire theoretical virtues approach. We then argue that theoretical virtues cannot
play the role of being a guide to truth in metaphysical theorizing either. roughout
the discussion, the central difficulty is that such virtues are not truth conducive.
3 e Basic Form
e largely assumed and unstated form of arguments from theoretical virtues is some
variation on modus ponens:
(1) If a theoryT is more virtuous (i.e., it satisfies more theoretical virtues)
than any of its relevant competitors, then T is true.
(2) T is more virtuous than any of its relevant competitors.
(3) T is true.
Of course, real-life instances of the argument are slightly more subtle. (1) is usually
qualified. T is only more likely to be true than its less virtuous competitors. e ‘more
likely’ is likewise qualified to mean that there is more reason to believe T rather than
any of its competitors, since, in many instances, it is hard to determine the objective
probabilities for theories. us, it is difficult to use effectively such probabilities in
rational theory choice.
is form of argument has been widely adopted in metaphysics. Consider, for
instance, the use that Williamson makes of it. Aer claiming that the more a theory T
‘has the intrinsic virtues of a good theory, the beer (ceteris paribus)’, he remarks:
When a theory T scores highly enough as a potential explanation of our
evidence E, and beer than its rivals [that is, when T is virtuous], we may
infer T from E by inference to the best explanation (Williamson, 2016,
p. 266).
Clearly, Williamson is endorsing here the first premise of the theoretical virtues
argument (albeit he is casting his remark as part of an abductive inference form, to
which we return later, rather than a deductive one).
ese qualifications might induce one to think that the basic form above is too
basic. Perhaps we should build into the form itself issues of reasons for belief.
(1′) IfT is more virtuous than any of its relevant competitors, then there
are good reasons to believe T .
(2′) T is more virtuous than any of its relevant competitors.
(3′) ere are good reasons to believe T .
What we gain on the swings, we lose on the roundabouts. (1′) presents us with a
bit of misdirection, since, in contrast to (1), it no longer focuses on the truth of the
relevant theories. Much of so-called analytic metaphysics styles itself as engaged in
truth-directed theorizing. e project is to discern how things are and reasons to
believe how these things are is to be informed by how those things are. Talk of theories
and their truth or falsity is just talk of how things are in linguistic guise. Good reason
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for belief absent the implication that what is believed is properly taken to be the case
typically is not the goal of those arguing from theoretical virtues.
It is no violence, then, to the use to which inferences from theoretical virtues are
put to treat the original modus ponens argument as sufficiently correct. No part of the
following discussion exploits complaints about T being the best of a bad lot or that T
may still be quite unlikely, given what is to be said for its competitors and the sum of
their “likelihoods”. We will examine critically the assumption that scientific practice
vindicates such reasoning in empirical contexts. If it is not vindicated there, then the
claim that at least this mode of philosophical inference is continuous with the sciences
falls at the first hurdle. We will examine in turn the merits of each premise, arguing
that (1) is false and that no dialectically-respectable grounds are available for (2).
4 e Conditional Premise
We question both the extent to which scientific practice itself relies on such theoretical
virtue arguments (beyond providing pragmatic reasons for acceptance of the relevant
theories) and whether these virtues legitimately provide grounds for commitment
to the existence of the ontology that is thereby postulated. First, scientific theory
choice typically appeals to theoretical virtues in comparative contexts when theories
are roughly empirically equivalent. In this case, theories are chosen primarily for
pragmatic reasons; empirically there is no differentiating them. But pragmatic reasons
are not epistemic: they provide reasons for preferring to work with a theory rather
than reasons for howwell the theory represents the world. Pragmatic choices like these
provide no guidance to metaphysicians who intend at least to approximate the truth
in maers metaphysical. (For an account of theoretical virtues as pragmatic rather
than epistemic—that is, as concerned with the users of the theory, their preferences
and predilections, rather than with the relation between theory and the world—see
(van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 12–13); for a discussion of this point in the context of a theory
of possible worlds, see (Bueno and Shalkowski, 2015).)
As argued in §2, metaphysicians maintaining that theoretical virtues have epistemic
significance owe us some argument showing how these maers manage to track reality.
On pain of circularity, the metametaphysical argument cannot be that it is theoretically
more virtuous to maintain that theoretically more virtuous metaphysical theories are
more likely to be true. A direct argument is needed for the conclusion that simplicity,
unification, and expressive and explanatory power (or any other theoretical virtues to
which one might like to appeal) are indeed truth conducive. It will, furthermore, not
do to argue that theoretically more virtuous scientific theories have shown themselves
to be closer to the truth than their less virtuous competitors, for two reasons. e first
and most philosophically-general reason is that as with all generalization strategies,
the generalizing must be warranted. Since empirical maers are so narrow when
compared to the panoply of metaphysical possibilities, there is not yet good reason to
think that the narrow range of possibilities that are currently consistent with our best
physical theories are sufficiently like the rest of the range of possibilities to warrant
generalizing empirical methods for metaphysical purposes. is reason speaks to the
alleged difference between scientific and metaphysical projects. e second reason
speaks to an error in the key part of the relevant metaphysical myth, namely that
science’s drive toward truth is guided by comparative virtues.
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4.1 Considerations from the Sciences
Consider the celebrated case of the transition from Ptolemy’s to Copernicus’s theory
in astronomy, of which Kuhn (1957) provides a rich examination and Cohen (1983)
offers a useful discussion. e standard ways of assessing the relative virtuousness of
their respective theories would not support Copernicus’s over Ptolemy’s, despite the
falsity of the laer. Ptolemy’s astronomy was the first ever unification of physics and
astronomy. While Aristotle’s physics was then the leading account of motion of objects
on Earth, it lacked a detailed astronomical theory. Ptolemy’s astronomy addressed this
issue, but since it was built on Aristotle’s physics, it faced a serious difficulty at once:
the observed motion of Mars included a retrograde trajectory that seemed to conflict
with the Aristotelian requirement that planets move in circles. Undeterred, Ptolemy
introduced an important conceptual innovation: the epicycle, a circle centered on the
circumference of another circle. Epicycles allowed him to explain how the motion of
Mars could be retrograde. Ptolemy’s great achievement was an astronomical theory
that reasonably fied the celestial data, while being consistent with the dominant
physics of his time. e resulting theory was unified (it brought together physics
and astronomy), explanatory (it systematically accounted for the motion of planets as
orbiting in circles around a stationary Earth, thus preserving appearances), and simple
(since all celestial motion was circular).
In contrast, Copernicus’ theory compares poorly on these virtues. First, it is less
unified than Ptolemy’s. At the time in which Copernicus developed his conception,
there was no physics of a moving Earth. In the first chapter of On the Revolutions of
the Heavenly Spheres (Copernicus, 1543/1976), Copernicus had to address well-known
objections to the very possibility of a moving Earth, which involved concerns of the
kind: If the Earth is moving, how can birds return to their nests or why does a dropped
stone end up at one’s feet rather than a few inches away? Not having a physics of
a moving Earth at his disposal, Copernicus tried to deflate the objections as swily
as he could, but it was very clear that the lack of a proper physics raised substantial
difficulties for his entire project. In proposing an heliocentric system in the absence of a
suitable physics, Copernicus clashed with the highly unified conception that Ptolemy’s
theory provided. On the unification front, Copernicus clearly lost.
It is oen claimed that Copernicus’ theory is simpler than Ptolemy’s, since the
former does not invoke epicycles, but not even this is right. Although epicycles are
unnecessary to account for Mars’ retrograde motion in Copernicus’ theory, they are
still required to explain other planetary motions (Kuhn, 1957; Cohen, 1983). e fact
that the entire planetary system needed to be reconfigured in a way that went against
the best physical theory of the time—namely, Aristotle’s physics—also counted against
the theory’s simplicity. It required a dramatic shi from the then-accepted conception
of the universe in no small part by moving away from a highly intuitive foundational
physics.
e explanatory power of Copernicus’s theory in comparison with Ptolemy’s was
also compromised. e former accounts for the phenomena on the assumption that the
Earth is moving around the Sun rather than the other way around. At the time in which
Copernicus’ theory was formulated, however, there was surprisingly lile evidence for
that assumption. It was one of the main accomplishments of Galileo to valiantly forge
considerations in support of the Copernican theory, in works such as Starry Messenger
(Galilei, 1610/2009) and Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems: Ptolemaic
and Copernican (Galilei, 1632/1953). Given the natural tendency to let predecessors
of modern, more correct theories inherit illicitly the glow of plausibility from their
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successors, it must be fully appreciated that Galileo’s arguments flew in the face of
the best theory of his time. at Venus has phases similar to the Moon, that Jupiter
has satellites similar to the Earth, that the Moon has valleys and mountains not unlike
the Earth’s were claims he made on the basis of interpreting data acquired by using
an instrument (the telescope), the reliability of which regarding celestial maers,
according the Aristotelian theory, had no basis. Aer all, on that theory, the celestial
domain, which functions immutably in accordance with perfect circles, operates in an
entirely different way than does the sublunar domain, which is subject to change, decay
and erratic motion. With hindsight, we now judge that Galileo was factually correct
and right to defend the Copernican conception. At the time, whatever intellectually
respectable grounds there might have been for choosing the Copernican theory over
the Ptolemaic, they cannot have been that Copernicus’s theory was more explanatory
than Ptolemy’s. ite to the contrary, the available evidence and the then-accepted
physics went against the Copernican conception not least because it undermined the
evidential value of the instrument that was crucial for gathering Galileo’s supporting
evidence (Feyerabend, 1975). A serious application of theoretical utility considerations
in Galileo’s day would have favoured Ptolemy’s theory over Copernicus’s, not the
other way around.
Only when Newton formulated his theory in Philosophia Naturalis Principia Math-
ematica (Newton, 1687) was a unification between physics and astronomy finally
obtained again (Cohen, 1983). Newton’s theory embodies all of the commonly-cited
theoretical virtues. It is simple (it relies on gravity); it is unified (it brings together
motion of celestial bodies and objects on the surface of the Earth, it accounts for
the tides and other natural phenomena), and it is explanatory (it explains, in light of
gravity, why objects, whether sub- or superlunar, move the way they do).
Despite this impressive feat regarding theoretical virtues, Newton’s theory turns
out to be false. ere is no Newtonian action-at-a-distance gravitational force, though;
if relativity theory is right, there is curvature of space-time. If what was perhaps the
most theoretically virtuous physical theory turns out to have been false, it is hard to
see why being virtuous could be properly treated as a mark of truth.
Furthermore, such virtue is not even necessary for the truth. e shi to (non-
relativistic) quantum mechanics cannot be properly accounted for by invoking a
theoretical utility argument. Aer all, (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics does not
satisfy the theoretical virtues, despite the impressive empirical success of the theory.
e theory is not simple, since it is highly counterintuitive, and requires a number of
distinctive mathematical procedures. It introduced a new disunity into physics, since it
is inconsistent with relativity theory. Even though it successfully predicted a number
of new phenomena, its explanatory power is suspect, given its multiple, incompatible
interpretations. ose incompatible interpretations leave us without a unique account
of the underlying realities that give rise to the observable phenomena. It is unclear
that the theory has fully explained those phenomena given that—in light of admissible
interpretations—it cannot be determined whether the outcome of observations emerges
because upon measurement a physical system evolves from a superposition of states
or because the world splits into different worlds, among many possibilities (Hughes,
1989; van Fraassen, 1991; Wallace, 2012). If the underlying features of the system are
not well understood, the explanatory capacities of the relevant theory are not driving
its adoption. If the commonly-cited theoretical virtues really are markers of truth,
they seem not to be driving crucial aspects of scientific activity and, so, the roles those
virtues play in the sciences are not good guides to good method for metaphysicians.
8
e situation is no different in a non-empirical domain. Frege’s original formulation
of arithmetic offers a clear example. Frege’s is a theory that embodies all theoretical
virtues: it is simple (it relies on logic and definitions); it is unified (it brings together
arithmetic and logic—in fact, for the logicist, arithmetic is nothing but logic plus
definitions); it has expressive power (arithmetical truths can all be expressed in terms
of suitable second-order statements); and it is explanatory (it accounts for the nature of
numbers while preserving all arithmetical truths). Sadly, the theory is also false. Worse
than beingmerely false, Frege’s original formulation of arithmetic is not even consistent.
us, the satisfaction of theoretical virtues is neither necessary nor sufficient for a
theory to be truth conducive.
Copernican theory, Newtonian mechanics, and quantum mechanics are all unques-
tionably extremely successful theories. at arguments based on theoretical virtues
fail to ratify these theories for what they are correctly taken to be—namely, clear cases
of successful scientific theories—undermines any claim that such arguments are so
central to actual scientific methodology. Metaphysicians assume an inaccurate account
of scientific practice.
Suppose, though, that some scientists do reason from theoretical virtue to theo-
retical accuracy when empirical adequacy does not suffice. ose scientists owe us,
then, exactly the same non-question-begging arguments owed to us by metaphysicians.
Both enterprises purport to discover or determine what there is and how it is. It is
easy to understand the pragmatic value of theories with the typically-sought virtues,
being easier to work with as they are. It is also easy to see how they are proxy for
other things we value. eories that are simpler, unified, powerfully expressive, and
explanatory may possess non-theoretical virtues that we value. at virtuous theories
beer track reality than do their less virtuous competitors is established by neither
of these facts. First, these facts alone are not enough to make theoretical virtues
truth-conducive. Second, it is similarly inadequate to build into a given theory one’s
preferred theoretical virtue (such as, simplicity) and then invoke the satisfaction of
such a virtue as a sign of the theory’s accuracy—unless one has independent reasons
to believe that reality has the virtue in question (in this case, that it is indeed simple).
But whether reality has or has not the corresponding virtue is precisely what one is
trying to determine in the first place; one cannot invoke a theoretical utility argument
to determine whether the theoretical virtues in question obtain without begging the
question. In other words, once both the scientific and metaphysical enterprises are
taken to be in the business of describing important features of reality, it is manifestly
inadmissible to build values of reality’s parameters into the characteristics of theories
we seek and then use those characteristics as signs of theoretical accuracy. at is for
both scientists and metaphysicians not to do their respective jobs.
4.2 A Philosophical Variation
In metaphysics, the use of theoretical utility considerations in support of one’s ontology
has been strongly advocated by David Lewis. Drawing on an analogy with set theory,
he notes:
Set theory offers the mathematician great economy of primitives and
premises, in return for accepting rather a lot of entities [. . . ]. e price is
right; the benefits in theoretical unity and economy are well worth the
entities.
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[. . . ] If we want the theoretical benefits that talk of possibilia brings,
the most straightforward way to gain honest title to them is to accept
such talk as the literal truth. It is my view that the price is right, if less
spectacularly so than in the mathematical parallel. e benefits are worth
their ontological cost. Modal realism is fruitful; that gives us good reason
to believe that it is true (Lewis, 1986, p. 4).
Why think that theoretical benefits provide reason to think that the relevant talk is
literally true? We do not usually take being in our interest to be a sign of truth. What,
exactly, is the link between utility and truth conduciveness? is link is assumed
by Lewis and others, but its assumption does not suffice, since it is easy to multiply
examples of benefits and convenience conferred by falsehoods.
Strictly speaking, Lewis urges on us a cost-benefit analysis. How odd to employ
something appropriate for a decision context (where deliberation is directed at what to
do) in an epistemic context (where deliberation is directed at what to believe). Grounds
for deciding what to do are not grounds for believing what is the case, regardless of
how much what one believes enters into one’s deliberations about what to do. One
can decide to act against the facts, contrary to evidence, and in conflict with one’s best
judgement. Actions toward which deliberations are directed are typically voluntary in
ways beliefs usually are not. One cannot simply decide to believe that there is a pink
elephant in the room, even though one can decide to act as though there were. Because
decision contexts are fundamentally different from epistemic context, cost-benefit
analyses are fundamentally inapt for metaphysical inquiry precisely because they
inevitably conflate pragmatic and epistemic reasons. For the “costs” and “benefits” of a
theory to have epistemic merit the relevant features that are transgressed by the costs
and to which the benefits conform must have been either assumed to be characteristics
of reality or to have been justified by other means. If assumed, questions about the
structure of reality have been begged. If justified by other means, the argument from
theoretical virtue is redundant for establishing that characteristic of the world.
Aer the cost-benefit analysis is performed, one may end up with reasons to accept
a metaphysical theory, since it has a number of significant benefits without too many
costs. By accepting such a theory on the basis of theoretical virtues, one would have
pragmatic reasons to prefer working with it: simplicity, expressive and explanatory
power are all good theoretical traits; they provide at least some of what one wants
from a theory. As argued above, however, they fail to offer what is needed to capture
the basic structures of reality: they are not truth conducive.
In light of these considerations, the first premise of the theoretical virtues argument
does not go through. We now move to the second.
5 e Virtue Premise
A key feature of the argument from theoretical virtues is to establish that the theories
under consideration do exhibit the relevant virtues. is is the role of the second
premise of the argument. For some of the virtues, however, in order to claim that a
given theory is virtuous and, indeed, more virtuous than its rivals, one must suppose
that the theory in question is true; otherwise, the virtues in question do not obtain. To
support this point from the sciences, we consider Newtonian physics and Mercury’s
perihelion. From metaphysics, we consider modal realism.
Mercury’s orbit of Mercury did not conform to predictions based on Newtonian
physics. Physicists posited the existence of a planet—Vulcan—betweenMercury and the
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Sun whose presence would account for the deviation that was observed in Mercury’s
orbit when it gets closer to the Sun. Aer multiple unsuccessful aempts to detect the
planet and the assessment that observational capabilities sufficed to conclude that if
Vulcan existed and explained Mercury’s orbital anomalies, Vulcan would have been
observed, physicists concluded that it does not exist. us, Newtonian mechanics has
no explanatory power regarding fine-grained details of Mercury’s orbit. All claims to
explanatory virtues depend on the correctness of the theory and cannot be used to
establish its correctness. us exposed is Williamson’s use of the explanatory virtue as
a mark of truth while characterizing a theory as having that virtue in modal terms, i.e.,
that it would explain relevant maers beer, if true (Williamson, 2016, p. 266). “We
should think it true, because it would do a beer job of explaining things were it true”
is an expression of hope, rather than an articulation of a plausible basis for thinking a
theory true. at it would do a beer job is thought to justify that it does a beer job.
at it does a beer job is thought to justify embracing it as true. A conclusion that a
theory is true, however, cannot be warranted on the basis of a premise regarding its
potential to do or to be something or other.
A problem specific to any claims to explanatory virtue parallels claims to simplicity
made above. Making breadth or depth of explanation a virtue for identifying a theory
as (more likely to be) correct is to assume that the world is not intractably complex,
disjoint, disconnected, and unpredictable. is may be the working assumption of any
scientific enterprise that is at all theoretical and not limited to descriptive activities.
at it must be presupposed for rational activity does not provide it any epistemic force
at all. e mutually inconsistent, unintuitive interpretations of quantum theory have
forced us to recognize that assumptions about the availability of satisfying explanations
is, indeed, an assumption. To that degree, we have grounds for recognizing that the
world may not conform to our explanatory assumptions, showing the assumption to
be illicit when taken as a marker of truth.
Turning to metaphysics, we find a similar fault in the work of David Lewis, who has
engaged in a rather comprehensive project of defending his well-known modal realism
(Lewis, 1986). According to this view, modal vocabulary and identity are exchanged
for quantification over spatiotemporally disconnected spatiotemporal wholes and
counterpart relations. Much effort has been expended both by Lewis and sympathizers
to work out the subtle details, which we do not dispute. e concern is that it is only
by assuming the truth of modal realism that one can obtain any explanatory advantage
from the view. However, whether the view is true or not is precisely what needs to be
determined. In the end, to obtain support for the second premise of the theoretical
utility argument, one needs to assume the truth of the very theory that argument is
meant to support.
Consider that, no doubt, Lewis could have been a dentist rather than a philosopher.
is truth, however, ends as a falsehood if there is no plurality of worlds. Similarly,
in the absence of that plurality, the modal realist has no resources to account for the
objectivity of the fact that Lewis could have been a dentist, and thus argue that modal
realism provides a beer account of modal reality than its rivals. Affirming the virtue
premise of any argument from theoretical virtues is a dialectically illicit affirmation.
e virtue accrues to a theory only if it is true, but the argument depending on the
theory’s virtue is precisely an argument for the theory’s truth.
Similarly for claims that counterpart relations will do when compared to identity
across possible worlds. e table before us is breakable; this very table is. What does
that come to? If there is only one spatiotemporal whole, then it cannot come to there
being another in which a numerically distinct table represents our table sufficiently
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well that the breaking of the other suffices to make it that ours could have broken.
is is not a rehashing of Kripke’s “Humphrey” objection (Kripke, 1980). We do not
complain that we are interested in whether this table could have broken, but are treated
only to a story about how that table did break. We do not impose here a constraint on
the semantics and metaphysics of modality that rules out modal realism at the outset.
We complain only that the virtue of exposing the reality underlying the possibility of
our table breaking accrues to modal realism only if modal realism is correct, making a
claim to its virtue illicit in an argument for its truth.
ese considerations highlight that using theoretical virtues as tools of persuasion
is ill conceived. ey require the commitment to what one is trying to establish in the
first place. In the end, this puts pressure on the very idea of using theoretical utility
arguments as a source of epistemic justification.
We have now exposed why the more traditional way of understanding abductive
inference is not useful when thinking about permissible philosophical argumentation.
In its general structure, the argument has the form of affirming the consequent, where
the conditional premise has as its antecedent a theory T and its consequent e , the
relevant evidence. In empirical contexts, we have the advantage that, in properly
chosen conditions, e is determinable independent of a prior determination of the
correctness of T . e very features of metaphysical inquiry that drive philosophers to
theoretical utility arguments are those that prevent the acceptability of these arguments
as legitimate tools of persuasion about the theory in question precisely because this
kind of independent determination of relevant facts is impossible. Hardly anything
about whether a theory really possesses the virtues cited on its behalf is available absent
assuming the theory. Further complaints about whether any versions of affirming
the consequent provides non-deductive grounds for an empirical theory are best le
for another occasion. It suffices here to note that no such version is available to
philosophers for the reasons we have given.
6 Conclusion
eoretical utility arguments have been prominent in the support of the truth of
metaphysical theories. We argued that both in science and in metaphysics such
arguments fail to establish the truth of the theories in question.
Empiricism was long characterized by a distinction between evidence and theory.
Critics, such as ine, maintained that this distinction is untenable and opted for
confirmational holism. eories stand or fall as wholes and no part is immune from
revision (ine, 1951). Consequently, any theoretical or observational claim can
be retained so long as suitable adjustments are made to other factual or theoretical
statements. Absent any possible appeal to evidence, holists depend on assessing the
theoretical virtues of competing theories. A significant consequence of what we have
argued here is that such assessments are dead ends for confirmational holists who
are realists about theories so chosen. ose who wish to retain their holism and their
arguments from theoretical virtues must adopt some non-realist aitude toward their
chosen theories.
Of course, metaphysicians could devise alternative strategies to uncover the truth
about the world. It is their burden, then, to establish that such strategies—whatever
they might be—tend toward the truth. Given the nature of the metaphysical enterprise,
it is not at all clear how this is to be accomplished. Nevertheless, those wishing for
robust metaphysical results must face the task at hand.
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